Commentary: Tainted Costs Revisited by McKinney, Luther C.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1972 Issue 2 
January 1972 
Commentary: Tainted Costs Revisited 
Luther C. McKinney 
Illinois Bar Association 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Luther C. McKinney, Commentary: Tainted Costs Revisited, 1972 WASH. U. L. Q. 239 (1972). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1972/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
COMMENTARY
Editor's Note: The following comments by Mr. McKinney and
Professor Kuhlman are based on their presentations to the St. Louis
Bar Association, November 16, 1971. These two experts-one a
lawyer, the other an economist-have been engaged in a continuing
dialogue on how best to achieve the objectives of the antitrust
laws. The precise issue discussed here, the admissibility of cost
data in defense of an antitrust conspiracy charge, was the subject
of a previous article-response in the BUSINESS LAWYER. The
primary objective of both the authors and the Quarterly is to pro-
mote a continuing dialogue between lawyers and economists.
TAINTED COSTS REVISITED
Luther C. McKinney*
The position I have maintained and continue to maintain in this
continuing exchange of views with Dr. Kuhlman is that a defendant in
a treble damage price fixing case should be allowed to introduce
economic evidence, such as his own contemporaneous costs, to defeat
claims being made against him.1 On the other hand, Dr. Kuhlman,
a Professor of Economics, disagrees, urging instead that the use of
such cost data-as well as other economic information-should not be
allowed until adjusted or "detainted" by the defendant to reflect the
costs which would have obtained in the absence of the very conspiracy
which the defendant denies ever existed.'
The subject of our controversy appears in only a few reported de-
cisions. 3 Courts' rulings on the question are normally rendered in
* Member of the Illinois Bar.
1. McKinney, Are Costs Presumptively Unreliable In a Collusive Market?, 23
Bus. Law. 713 (1968).
2. Kuhlman, The Reliability of Costs in a Collusive Market: A Comment, 25
Bus. LAw. 351 (1969). Indeed it appears that Dr. Kuhlman would urge the same
rule as to all economic factors including capacity, capacity utilization, demand, back-
logs, orders and the like. Id. at 353.
3. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 40 F.R.D. 96 (N.D. Ill.
1966); Ohio Valley Electric Corp. v. General Electric Co., 244 F. Supp. 914 (S.D.
N.Y. 1965).
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unreported pretrial conferences. 4 Also, where defendants have been
precluded from using this type of evidence in their defense, for the
reasons championed by Dr. Kuhlman, they have often chosen to settle
the case rather than litigate or appeal the matter.5
Our prior exchange of views has already exposed a basic problem.
Dr. Kuhlman, a non-lawyer, expressly disclaims an intent to "explore
any legal issue which may be involved."6 Similarly, most members
of my profession, including myself, do not purport to be experts in
economics. Thus I see a danger of misunderstanding and failure to
focus on the real issues if each of us must resort entirely to the jargon
of our respective professions. Accordingly, I shall try to point out
what in Dr. Kuhlman's thesis bothers me, recognizing that to do so
may brand me as a self-proclaimed economist.
First, Dr. Kuhlman's thesis for excluding contemporaneous costs as
evidence is premised on an assumption that a conspiracy exists merely
because it is charged by the plaintiff. This is clear from his statement
that the "basic economic issue in a treble damage action is the esti-
mation of damages. . ... I With this I cannot agree. Except in the
very unusual case, the most basic issue-economic or otherwise-is
whether there is a conspiracy at all.
Even where a government criminal or civil case precedes the private
treble damage case, the issue of conspiracy often remains a central
issue for one of several reasons. This may be because a defendant
wins the government case. Also, the defendant may have pleaded
nolo contendere to the charge. Even where a judgment of guilt has
been entered after the taking of testimony in the prior case the gov-
ernment case may have involved a local conspiracy, rather than a
much broader regional or national conspiracy alleged in the private
complaint.
4. Northwest Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Maloney Electric Co., Civ. No.
13290-3 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 29, 1964) (costs not allowed in evidence); Public Util.
Dist. No. 1 v. General Electric Co., Civ. No. 5271 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 8, 1964) (tenta-
tive ruling that costs would be admissible); City of San Antonio v. Westinghouse Elec-
tric Corp., No. 3064 (W.D. Tex. 1964) (costs excluded); Washington Public Power
System v. American Pipe & Construction, Civ. No. 6568 (W.D. Wash. 1968) (costs
allowed in evidence); City of Burlington v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., No. 348-62
(D.D.C. 1964) (costs allowed in evidence).
5. E.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 40 F.R.D. 96
(N.D. Ill. 1966); Northwest Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Maloney Electric Co.,
Civ. No. 13290-3 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 29, 1964).
6. Kuhlman, supra note 2, at 351.




The use of economic evidence-including cost data-in contesting
the issue of conspiracy is not a new or novel one, and the effectiveness
of the use of such data to disprove conspiracy has been demonstrated.
More than twenty years ago, members of the St. Louis Bar, in Pevely
Dairy Co. v. United States,8 successfully demonstrated that all price
changes alleged by the government to have resulted from collusion
were in fact justified by cost increases or decreases.
The trial court in Continental Baking Co. v. United States? adopted
a rationale analogous to Dr. Kuhlman's and refused to permit de-
fendants in a price fixing case to introduce evidence that their prices
resulted from economic factors rather than collusive agreements. On
appeal, this ruling was held to be erroneous on the ground that it was
for the jury to weigh the evidence of these economic factors against
meetings among competitors proven by the government and determine
the inference to draw.1"
Thus my position finds support at the appellate level in the federal
courts and has support in economic literature as well. Professor W.
Bruce Erickson of the University of Minnesota made this clear when
he explained that:
...the lines of demarcation among activities reflecting price fixing,
various forms of tacit but not legally actionable collusion, and com-
petition are imprecise.
Under such conditions, cost data become an essential adjunct to price
series data. . . .Where objective confirmation of the existence and the
effects of conspiracy from economic data is required, access to and
subsequent use of cost information become of primary importance."'
I believe that time will prove wrong Judge Robson's decision to the
contrary on this issue in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers
Mfg. Co.12 There, the defendant contended that its actual costs were
relevant to refute the conspiracy allegations on which the court had
previously declined to enter a summary judgment for the plaintiff. The
court would not permit the use of defendant's cost data on the theory
that this cost evidence might be tainted.
8. 178 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 942 (1950).
9. 281 F.2d 137, 141-42 (6th Cir. 1960) (lower court opinion unreported). See
also United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 281 F. Supp. 837, 847 (S.D. N.Y. 1968).
10. 281 F.2d at 143.
11. Erickson, Costs and Conspiracy: The Uses of Cost Data In Private Antitrust
Litigation, 14 ANTrTRusT BULL. 347, 350-52 (1969).
12. 40 F.R.D. 96 (N.D. Ill. 1966).
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Judge Feinberg in the Ohio Valley Electric case expressed what I
believe to be the better reasoned position that defendants are permitted
to introduce economic data to show that price movements and levels
were the result of economic forces rather than conspiracy.13 Judge
Robson distinguished this case on the ground that it was a bench
trial, not a jury trial. However, Judge Bolt in Washington Public
Power System v. American Pipe & Construction,14 a subsequent jury
trial, did permit defendants to introduce cost evidence. Thus I be-
lieve that the weight of authority is for the admissibility of economic
evidence to refute the existence of conspiracy.
The next problem I have with Dr. Kuhlman's thesis is that it would
foreclose the use of such evidence to refute the claim that a conspiracy
damaged plaintiff in a measurable amount. Dr. Kuhlman states "that
there is an a priori basis in economics for challenging industry data
where that data was generated by the firms in the industry controlled
by the price-fixing arrangement."'" However, to my knowledge, two
of his fellow economists, Professors Richard Leftwich'0 and Morris
A. Adelman,17 have taken the position that there is no immutable
economic rule that a conspiratorial combination among sellers neces-
sarily or probably has the effect of significantly raising the sellers'
costs in such a market.
Neither I, nor I believe Professors Adelman and Leftwich, would
argue the obverse of Dr. Kuhlman's position-that conspiracy cannot
affect costs; however, I would urge that it should be incumbent upon
the plaintiff to come forward and show that costs are in fact inflated.
The fact that plaintiffs have done so in prior cases demonstrates that
this is not such an impossibility as to warrant shifting the burden to the
defendant to prove a negative.' 8
I would inquire of Dr. Kuhlman (1) whether his "a priori basis" is
any more than a theoretical possibility and (2) whether it always fol-
13. Ohio Valley Electric Corp. v. General Electric Co., 244 F. Supp. 914, 952
(S.D. N.Y. 1965).
14. Civ. No. 6568 (W.D. Wash. 1968).
15. Kuhlman, supra note 2, at 354. See also White, The Use of Cost Data In Pri-
vate Antitrust Cases, 12 ANTmTRusT BuLL. 1091 (1967).
16. Transcript at 6237-46, Northwest Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v. Maloney
Electric Co., Civ. No. 13290-3 (W.D. Mo. 1964).
17. Transcript at 4875-76, Ohio Valley Electric Corp. v. General Electric Co.,
244 F. Supp. 914 (S.D. N.Y. 1965).
18. See, e.g., Ohio Valley Electric Corp. v. General Electric Co., 244 F. Supp,




lows as night the day from his "a priori basis" "that collusive agree-
ments will affect costs."' 9  A no answer to either one of these ques-
tions would appear to me from a legal point of view to relieve a
defendant of any possible burden to detaint cost evidence.
Dr. Kuhlman postulates that where price is increased through collu-
sion, the total numbers of units purchased may fall, thus increasing
the cost per unit. However, Dr. Kuhlman himself recognizes that
this is not an economic rule of universal applicability by acknowledg-
ing that it does not apply where the demand for the product is
inelastic. He illustrates his general proposition by noting that "the
unit costs of 1000 transformers will tend to be higher than unit costs
of 2000 transformers."'  But in a footnote he explains that costs
really would not be increased for this reason in the case of trans-
formers because "the demand is relatively inelastic and thus higher
price would not result in a proportionate reduction in quantity sold."21
I would also point out that there is a flaw in the application of Dr.
Kuhlman's basic postulate to any antitrust case. He is on record as
having said that "[a] necessary condition for the existence of a price
fixing ring is an industry demand which permits the participating
firms to raise prices without experiencing a proportionate reduction in
quantity." 2  Put another way, the demand for the product must be
inelastic. Thus, Dr. Kuhlman's prerequisite for an effective conspiracy
precludes any increase in costs resulting from an increase in price.
Professor Erickson suggests that an opposite conclusion with respect
to Dr. Kuhlman's basic postulate is possible. He has said:
A more persuasive argument is that, if the conspiracy is successful in
impeding entry or in encouraging exit, given economies of scale, the
net result could be to lower costs. 23
19. Kuhlman, supra note 2, at 352.
20. Id. at 352.
21. Id. at 352 n.2. In an earlier article Dr. Kuhlman noted that "the quantity of
transformers sold would not be responsive to changes in price." Kuhlman, Theoretical
Issues In the Estimation of Damages In a Private Antitrust Action, 33 Soursnm
EcON. J. 548, 549 (1967).
22. Kuhlman, Theoretical Issues In the Estimation of Damages In a Private
Antitrust Action, 33 SOUTHERN EcON. J. 548, 551 (1967). Or as stated another way
by Dr. Kuhlman, "as the ring raises the price above the noncollusive level, there
must not be a relatively large drop in sales volume." Kuhlman, The Nature and
Significance of Price Fixing Rings, 2 ANnmusT L. AND EcoN. REV. 69, 73 (1969).
23. Erickson, supra note 11, at 359 n.27.
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Dr. Kuhlman has also speculated that costs will be raised because
output will have been allocated by conspiracy rather than competition,
thereby siphoning production to inefficient firms. In the first place,
this necessarily assumes widely varying efficiencies and cost levels. It
presupposes that absent conspiracy, the inefficient firms will go out of
business and that their volume can be added to the remaining firms
with the effect of every decreasing cost. Depending on a variety of
factors, such as capacity, this may not be the fact. Here again, such
speculation is a weak reed upon which to ground a rule that con-
temporaneous costs are presumptively unreliable.
Finally Dr. Kuhlman and I do agree on one point, and I quote:
.... there is no generally accepted economic theory or empirical evi-
dence to the effect that collusion dulls the incentive for increased effi-
ciency."2 14 However, we part company there because Dr. Kuhlman
adds that "it certainly seems reasonable to assume that a firm earning
5 percent on its investment will be somewhat more interested in in-
creased efficiency than the firm which is earning 50 percent or more." 25
It is difficult for me as a lawyer to conceive of a rule which would
permit the receipt of evidence if an alleged co-conspirator demon-
strated a small return on its investment but which would deny the
receipt if an alleged co-conspirator has a larger return.
I submit that defendants' cost data should be treated as any other
evidence and should be admissible subject to attack on the same basis.
Any limitations on the relevance of cost data should go to their evi-
dentiary weight and not to their admissibility.
I suspect that some courts will not welcome the additional eco-
nomic evidence due to its time consuming nature. However, I do not
see how our adversary system of justice can work in these complex
cases if economic data from both sides is not furnished to the trier of
fact, whether it be judge or jury. Indeed, I believe, in a price fixing
case, jurors expect some cost information. In this connection I am
informed that jurors in one antitrust case indicated that adverse in-
ferences were drawn against a defendant because costs were not in-
troduced; in that case such costs had not been introduced because of
a ruling which refused to permit the introduction of that evidence. I
do not believe that such a result should obtain in our courts.
24. Kuhlman, supra note 2, at 352.
25. Id. at 353.
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